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Planes, Trains, Automobiles and the Action Per Quod Servitium 
Amisit  
 
Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258, High Court of Australia,  
2 October 2012 
 
The action per quod servitium amisit compensates an employer for the loss of an employee’s 
services, where such loss is caused due to the commission of a tort by a third party which injures the 
employee.  Although not commonly pleaded, such actions often arise when employees are harmed 
due to transportation accidents.  For example, where allowed,1 physical injury caused by the 
negligent driving of automobiles,2 and the psychiatric injury suffered by an engine driver upon 
averting a collision with a motorcyclist crossing before an oncoming train.3   
 
In Barclay v Penberthy, the High Court considered the action in the context of the loss of the 
services of employees injured or killed in a plane crash.  Accordingly, the case confirms that ‘the 
actio per quod servitium amisit is not drifting into desuetude’ but ‘retains utility for plaintiffs in a 
variety of practical circumstances’.4  In particular, it provides employers with an avenue of civil 
compensation which remains as a separate and potentially valuable alternative to a possible action 
in negligence for pure economic loss against the third party for the breach of a duty of care owed 
directly to the employer.  
 
Facts 
Nautronix carried on a marine technology research and development business.  In August 2003, it 
contracted with Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd (Fugro) to provide a commercial air charter service 
for the purpose of testing equipment designed by Nautronix which would allow aircraft to locate 
and communicate with submarines.  A plane was provided and modified by Fugro for this purpose.  
It was piloted by Fugro’s employee, Mr Penberthy, and carried five senior Nautronix employees 
including the team’s engineering director, project managers, software team leader and systems 
engineer.  The plane crashed shortly after take-off – killing two of Naturonix’s employees, and 
injuring another three as well as the pilot.  The accident was due to failure of the right-hand engine 
and Mr Penberthy’s negligent response to that failure.  The cause of the engine failure was the 
negligent design, three years previously, of a replacement fuel pump sleeve bearing by Mr Barclay, 
an aeronautical engineer.5   
 
At first instance,6 wrongful death (or fatal accident) claims were brought by the spouses of the 
deceased employees pursuant to the Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA), while the injured employees 
successfully sued Messers Penberthy and Barclay in negligence.  Fugro was held vicariously liable 
for Mr Penberthy’s negligence. In the High Court, however, the only issues that arose for 
consideration concerned Penberthy’s and Fugro’s liability to Nautronix in negligence and whether  
Penberthy, Fugro and Barclay were also liable to Nautronix in an action per quod.   
 
                                                 
1 See eg, Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 142 (prevents a per quod action for loss of services caused 
by a motor accident); Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (NT), s 5 (prevents an action for damages in respect a 
person’s death or injury from a motor accident). 
2 See eg, Argent Pty Ltd v Huxley [1971] Qd R 331.  Although resulting from injuries sustained by an employee due to 
the negligent driving of a motor vehicle, as the action was brought by the Crown in relation to public sector employees, 
it was held not to be available in The Commonwealth v Quince (1944) 68 CLR 227 and Attorney-General for New South 
Wales v The Perpetual Trustee Company (Limited) (1952) 85 CLR 237. 
3 Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Scott (1959) 102 CLR 392. 
4 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [104] (Heydon J). 
5 Ibid [5], [13], [119]. 
6 Ibid [14].  Cifuentes v Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 316. 
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High Court’s Decision 
The specific issues on appeal7 were then dealt with as follows: 
 
The rule in Baker v Bolton 
The first issue, was whether Nautronix was prevented from recovering, via a negligence action or 
otherwise, any economic loss suffered by it as a result of the deaths of its two employees.  This 
required a consideration of the rule in Baker v Bolton. Namely, that ‘[i]n a civil Court, the death of a 
human being could not be complained of as an injury’.8   
 
The rule has been the subject of statutory recognition or qualification.  For example, its presence 
necessitated the enactment of the Fatal Accidents legislation to provide a cause of action against 
wrongdoers for the benefit of a deceased’s statutorily defined family, and to compensate them for 
the loss of pecuniary support that would have been provided by the deceased.9  In addition, section 
58(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) specifically allows an award of damages for loss of 
servitium if ‘the injured person died as a result of the injuries suffered’.10 
 
The High Court therefore held that ‘[t]he pattern of Australian legislation [was] a pointer towards 
the continued existence of the rule in Baker v Bolton as a matter of common law’,11 and that any 
further refinement of its scope was a matter for the legislature.12  Consequently, a continued 
application of the rule in this context meant that Nautronix could not recover the pure economic loss 
flowing from the death of its two employees in either a negligence or a per quod action. 
 
The Action Per Quod Servitium Amisit  
Arguing for the action’s abolition, the defendants claimed that the per quod ‘action should no longer 
be permitted to stand apart from the law of negligence and should be treated as absorbed into it’ and 
the law regulating the recovery of pure economic loss.13   However, according to the High Court, 
there were several difficulties with this proposition: 
 
1. In a per quod action the tort committed must be a ‘wrong done to the servant’.14  An 
employee’s injury may be wrongfully caused because it was inflicted intentionally or in 
breach of a duty of care owed to the employee.  Consequently, the action did not ‘depend on 
demonstrating any breach of a duty of care owed by the wrongdoer’ to the employer.15  As 
such, the action could not be considered as subsumed by the law of negligence.  Rather, it 
was based upon an employer’s interest (or quasi-proprietary right) in the services of the 
employee (and not in the employee themselves).16  
2. There was no reason to view the action as inappropriate, such as incoherency or it working 
‘unsatisfactorily in conjunction with other legal principles’.17 
                                                 
7 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [21] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), 
[76]-[78] (Heydon J), [128] (Kiefel J).   
8 Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493, cited in Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [77], [127]. 
9 See eg, Carver, ‘Through the Looking Glass: Wrongful Death, Remarriage and Australian Law Reform’ (2005) 5(1) 
QUTLJJ 1, 1-3. 
10 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [24] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
11 Ibid [26]. 
12 Ibid [27] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [80]-[84], [108] (Heydon J), [178] (Kiefel J). 
13 Ibid [129] (Kiefel J).  See also [28] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [101] (Heydon J). 
14 Ibid [34] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
15 Ibid [35] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [91] (Heydon J). 
16 Ibid [33], [38]-[40] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [131], [141]-[142], [155] (Kiefel J).  The 
High Court’s distinction of the per quod and negligence actions has been criticised by Beever as being insufficient to 
provide justification for the per quod action’s retention.  He is also critical of grounding the action upon the interference 
with a quasi-proprietary right:  Beever, ‘Barclay v Penberthy and the Collapse of the High Court’s Jurisprudence’ 
(2012) 31(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 307. 
17 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [102] (Heydon J).  See also [101]. 
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3. The history of the per quod action ‘was connected to the idea of the status of a servant’,18 
which although ‘adapted somewhat to modern conceptions of the relationship of employer 
and employee, set it apart from [other] actions in tort’.19 
4. As the recovery of negligently inflicted pure economic loss is still considered to be a novel  
category,20 the existence of a duty of care owed directly to the employer remains to be 
determined on the facts of each individual case. Consequently, ‘[m]any employers would 
not be able to establish that a duty of care was owed to them’.21 
5. Being modified already by statute in several States,22 the action per quod servitium amisit 
could be presumed to still exist at common law, such that its abolition or modification,23 as a 
distinct cause of action, was again ‘an activity best left to legislatures’.24 
 
Consequently, the availability, or otherwise, of an action per quod (in relation to an employer’s loss 
of an employee’s services) was held irrelevant to whether (as discussed below) a separate duty of 
care was owed by the third party directly to the employer.25  This was in contrast to statements 
made by McLure P in the Western Australian Court of Appeal that: 
 
Consistency between closely related common law actions is a legitimate expectation.  
Whilst the action for loss of services remains part of the common law of Australia, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that a negligent defendant must owe to an employer a 
common law duty to take reasonable care to avoid causing pure economic loss by injuring 
its employees.  That conclusion is applicable to both Mr Penberthy and Mr Barclay.26 
 
Another consequence of maintaining the distinct actions concerned the unavailability of 
contributory negligence as a defence in the per quod action,27 and the remedy awarded.28  In per 
quod, the ‘principle underlying the action is liability for the employer’s loss of services, not the 
employer’s economic loss as such’.29  Consequently, while Nautronix alleged, without further 
particulars, ‘interruptions and delays in the development and testing of its marine technology and 
testing system and the loss of intellectual property and corporate knowledge’,30 the loss recoverable 
in an action per quod servitium amisit was limited to that flowing from depravation of the 
employee’s services,31 and did not extend to all foreseeable loss.  The High Court therefore 
considered that the damages awarded would reflect the cost of a substitute employee, or extra 
payments made to existing employees, less wages no longer paid to the injured employee.32 
                                                 
18 Ibid [131] (Kiefel J). 
19 Ibid [145]. 
20 See eg, Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
21 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [146] (Kiefel J).  See also [150]-[154]. 
22 See eg, Employees Liability Act 1991 (NSW), s 4 (abolition of action against employee for loss of services of fellow 
employee); Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), s 93 (prevents the recovery of damages in respect a person’s death or 
injury in a transport accident); Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 2011 (NT), s 5; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 
1999 (NSW), s 142 (discussed at above n 1 and accompanying text); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 58 (discussed at 
above n 10 and accompanying text). 
23 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [101], [105] (Heydon J). 
24 Ibid [37] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).  See also [105] (Heydon J). 
25 Ibid [18], [37] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [145] (Kiefel J). 
26 Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd v Cifuentes [2011] Aust Torts Reports ¶82-087 at 64,884. 
27 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [144]. 
28 Ibid [41].  See also [106]. 
29 Ibid [143]. 
30 Ibid [54].  See also [77], [110]-[114], [158]. 
31 Ibid [56], [60] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [124], [156], [160] (Kiefel J).  See also Attorney-
General for New South Wales v The Perpetual Trustee Company (Limited) (1952) 85 CLR 237.  The amount 
recoverable is also limited by provisions such as the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 58(2), (3) (damages for loss of 
servitium limited to three times the average weekly earnings per week). 
32 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [57]-[58] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and 
Bell JJ). 
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Damage to business or loss of profit, ‘unless attributable to the loss of services’,33 such as in the 
case of a particularly skilled and irreplaceable employee,34 is generally not allowed.35 According to 
Kiefel J, to permit broad recovery of the kind claimed by Nautronix for all profit lost: 
 
would be to transform an exceptional remedy for a particular type of loss into a substantial 
exception to the general principles which have developed concerning recovery of economic 
loss in tort.  In terms of coherence of the law, that would be undesirable.36 
 
Mitigation however requires an employer to engage a substitute ‘at or as near as practicable to the 
level of skill of the injured employee’.37  The continued payment of wages or sick pay, under statue, 
industrial award, or contract, cannot be claimed, as the obligation arises not due to the employee’s 
injury,38 but as a deferred payment for services rendered.      
 
All parties were therefore held liable to Nautronix, in respect of its three injured employees, in an 
action per quod and the measure of damages was remitted for trial.39  As a result, unlike the 
majority, Heydon J refused to provide what his Honour described as an “advisory opinion” on the 
measure of damages before evidence on that issue had been called.40  Heydon J was also disinclined 
to allow the action on the basis that it had only been raised by Nautronix for the first time in the 
High Court and evidence could have been presented at trial ‘which by any possibility could have 
prevented’41 the action from succeeding.  Such evidence was to the effect that the injured Nautronix 
personnel were not employees, but independent contractors.   
 
The Action for Negligently Inflicted Pure Economic Loss 
A majority of the High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ. Kiefel J 
delivering a separate judgement)42 also found Mr Penberthy and Fugro liable to Nautronix in 
negligence.  On the basis of principles espoused in cases such as Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The 
Dredge Willemstad,43 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd44 and Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty 
Ltd,45 a duty of care was owed in relation to Nautronix’s pure economic loss predominantly due to: 
 
 The defendants’ ‘knowledge of Nautronix’s project, its commercial purposes and the 
importance of the employees to the achievement of those purposes’46 such that injury to 
them would be likely to produce economic loss. 
  Nautronix’s vulnerability, or inability to protect itself from the consequences of the 
defendant’s want of reasonable care.47  In this respect, the High Court rejected an argument 
that Nautronix could have protected itself by negotiating a warranty that Fugro accept 
liability for loss arising from negligence injuring its employees, stating that ‘[a] conclusion 
                                                 
33 Ibid [61]. 
34 See eg, Argent Pty Ltd v Huxley [1971] Qd R 331.   
35 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [60]-[66] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and 
Bell JJ), [162], [164] (Kiefel J). 
36 Ibid [164].  See also [179]. 
37 Ibid [58]. 
38 Ibid [59].  Cf [150]. 
39 Ibid [53], [68] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [107] (Heydon J), [179] (Kiefel J). 
40 Ibid [109]-[114]. 
41 Ibid [96]-[97], [115]. 
42 Ibid [68] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [179] (Kiefel J). 
43 (1976) 136 CLR 529. 
44 (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
45 (2004) 216 CLR 515. 
46 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [176] (Kiefel J).  See also [43]-[44], [48] (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [118] (Kiefel J). 
47 See eg, Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515, [23], [31]. 
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that Fugro would have agreed to such a term is not open’48 and that ‘[t]he presence or 
absence of a claim in contract would not be determinative of a claim in tort’.49 
 
Justice Heydon dissented, attaching significance to the fact that the onus was on Nautronix (as the 
claimant) to show that it was vulnerable, in order for a duty of care to be owed.50  As there was no 
evidence, for example as to whether Fugro’s standard terms excluding liability were open to 
change, there was no duty. 
 
Consequently, while Heydon J’s judgement serves as an important reminder to claimants to ensure 
that they plead specific evidence of their vulnerability in order to support a duty of care for pure 
economic loss, it may be subject to the same criticism as similar findings made by a majority of the 
High Court in Woolcock Street Investments.51  Namely, that one ‘errs in assuming that the provision 
of warranties ... is either commonly sought or given.  Yet substantially on the basis of that 
possibility, [Nautronix was] put out of court’.52  Nevertheless, it must also be remembered that 
‘unless and until the principles respecting recovery of economic loss in tort are further extended’53 
many employers will be unable to establish a duty of care, whether due to an absence of knowledge, 
vulnerability or other relevant factor (such as determinate liability).  Realistically therefore, the 
action per quod servitium amisit may often be the only means available to recover damages 
consequent upon the loss of an employee’s services. 
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48 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [177] (Kiefel J).   
49 Ibid [47] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
50 Ibid [87]-[88]. 
51 (2004) 216 CLR 515, [31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon J), [96] (McHugh J). 
52 Ibid [178] (Kirby J). 
53 Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; [2012] HCA 40, [146] (Kiefel J).   
